groups behave toward each other in ways which either reflect or perpetuate the hegemonic ideology of subordination and the patterns of inequality iri daily life. These are, in turn, justified and explained by assumed differences in physical and biological characteristics, or in theories of cultural deprivation or intellectual inferiority. Thus, far from being static_ or fixed, ~_ ~ an oppr~~<:..<:.<>ncept within social relations iSHWd and ever-changing. An oppressed "racial group" changes over tune, geographical space and historical conjuncture. That which is termed "black/' "Hispanic" or "Oriental" by those in power to describe one human being's "racial background" in a particular setting can have ittle historical or practical meaning within another social formation hich is also racially stratified, but in a different manner. Since so many Americans view the world through the prism of permanent racial categories, it is difficuJt to convey the idea that radicaUy different ethnic groups may have roughly the same "racial r dentity" imposed on them. For example, although native-born AfricanAmericans, Trinidadians, Haitians, Nigerians and Afro-Brazilians would all be termed "black" on the streets of New York City, !.hey have remarkably little in common in terms of Ian a e culture ethnic traditions, n ua 5, an re 19tOUS affiliations. Yet they are all "black" racia y, In tense a ey WI s are many of the pitfalls and prejudices built into the institutional arrangements of the established social order for those defined as "black." Similarly, an even wider spectrum of divergent ethnic groups -from Japanese Americans, Chinese Americans, Filipino Americans, and Korean Americans to Hawaiians, Pakistanis, Vietnamese, Arabs and Uzbekis -are described and defined ' by the dominant society as '~siansn aT, worse still, as "Orientals." In the rigid, racially stratified American social order, the specific nation: iility, ethnicity and culture of a EeTSon of color has traditionall been secondary to an jndividu.~l's 'i~aciajcillegQ!y,!!alabel of inequality whIch is . imposed from without :ath~r~~!,structed by th= __ grou~ Trom wiilim. ef"iiSNIich aefOffii, Asian American Studies professor at tlie-University of California at Berkeley has observed, we are also "in a period in which our conception of racial categories is being radically transformed." The waves of recent immigrants create new concepts of what the older ethnic communities have been. The observations and generalizations we imparted "to racial identities" in the past no longer make that much sense.
In the United States. u race" for the a res~~~ has _ al~c:.....!9_ mean an identity of survival, victimization and oeposition to those racial groups or e Ites which exercise power and erivilege. _~~ ~re l <?OJ<.ing at here IS not an ethnit identification or culture but an awareness of sliared experience, suffering and struggles against the barriers of racial diVISion. I hese couect'JVe expenences, survival tales and grievances form the basis of a historical consciousness -a group's recognition of what it has witnessed and what it can anticipate in the near future. This second distinct sense of racial identity is imposed on the oppresseda;;d y et represents a reconstructed critical memory o(the character of the group's collective ordeals. Both definitions of u race" and "racial iden~ nty" gIVe character and substance to the movements for power and inlluence among people of color.
In the Mrican-American experience, the politics of racial identitr.. have been expressed by two great traditions of racial ideology and social protest: mte ralionism and black nationalism. The integrationist tradition was initiated in t e ante ellum political activism of the free Negro community of the North, articulated by the great abolitionist orator Frederick Douglass. The black nationalist tradition was a product of the same social classes, but inlluenced by the pessimism generated by the Compromise of 1850, the Fugitive Slave Act, the Dred SCOtl decision, and the failure of the slave uprisings and revolts such as Nat Turner's to end the tyranny and inhumanity of the slave regime. The i!1tegrationist perspective was anchored in a firm belief in American democracy, and in the struggle to outlaw all Ie al barriers which restncted equal access and opportunities to racial minorities. It was linked to the pnlitics of buildin coalitions with sympathetic white constituencies, aimed at achieving reforms within the context -orthe ------.
system. The integrationist version of racial politics sought the deracialization of the hierarchies of pow~r within society and the eeo: I ~.J!ys_~. By contrast,-the Wack nationalist approach to racial politics was profoundly skeptical of America's ability to live up to its democratic ideals. Il assumed that "racial categories" were real and fundamentally significant, and that efforts to accumulate ower e structured along t e boundaries of race for centuries to come. The \ ationalisl tradition emphasized the cultural kinship of black Americans to Africa, and emphasized the need to establish all-black-owned institutions to provide goods and services to the African~Amencan community.
\
Although the mtegrationists and nationalists seemed to hold radically divergent points of view, ~ere was a subterranean symmetry !;Jetween the two ideologies. Both w<:.re based oothe idea that the essential dilemma or problem confronting black pe~le was the omnipresent reality of race. The integrationists ,sought power to dismantle J earners of race, to outlaw legal restrictions on blacks' access to the institutions of authority and ownership, and to assimilate into the cultural "mainstream" without regard to race. The black nationalists favored a separatist path toward empowerment, believing that even the most liberal-minded whites could not be trusted to destroy the elaborate network of privileges from which they benefited, called "white supremacy. n But along the assimilationist-separatist axis of racial-identity politics is the common perception that "race, II however it is defined, is the most critical organizing variable within society. ]tace mattered so much morc than other factors or variables that, to a considerable degree, theconcepl of r~cewas perpetuat,,-d~ the es of .Ilolitical ' interven~ons and tactical assumptions by activis~ and leaders~oth sides of the assimilationistLs_ eparatist axis.
-Both-;cho"als of racial identity e §poused what can be . termed the politics of "sY.!!)bolic r~presentation." Both ilie"";:;;U;Onalists ana mtegrationists believed that they were speaking to "white power brokers" on behalf of their "constituents" -that is, black Americans. They believed that the real measure of racial power a group wielded within any society could be calibrated according to the institutions it dominated or the numbers of positions it controlled which influenced others. For the integrationists, it was a relatively simple matter of counting noses. If the number of Mrican-Americans in elective offices nationwide increased from 103 in 1964 to over 8,000 in 1993, for example, one could argue that African-Americans as a group had increased their political power. Any increase in the number of blacks as mayors, members of federal courts, and on boards of education, was championed as a victory for all black people. The black nationalists tended to be far more skeptical about the promise or viability of an electoral roule to group empowerment. However, they often shared the same notions of symbolic representation when it came to the construction of social and economic institutions based on private-ownership models. The development of a black-owned shopping plaza, supermarket or private school was widely interpreted as black social and economic empowerment for the group as a whole. The problem with "symbolic representation" is that it presumes structures of accountability and allegiance between those blacks who are elevated into powerful positions of authority in the capitalist state and the millions of Mrican-Americans clinging to the margins of economic and social existence. The unifying discourse of race obscures the growing class stratification within the Mrican-American communi .
ccording to the Census Bureau, for example, back in 1967 about 85 per cent of all African-American families earned between $5,000 and S50,OOO annually, measured in inflation-adjusted 1990 dollars. Some 4' per cent earned between $10,000 and 525,000. In short, the number of extremely poor and destitute families was relatively small. The Census Bureau's statistics on African-American households as of 1990 were strikingly different. The size of the black working class and the number of moderate-income people had declined significantly, and the two extremes of poverty and affluence had grown sharply. By 1990, about 12 per cent of all black households earned less than $5,000 annually. One-third of all blacks lived below the federal government's poverty level.
Conversely, a strong Mrican-American petty bourgeoisie, representing the growth ·of thousands of white-collar professionals, executives and managers created by affirmative-action requirements, has been established. The average median income of Mrican-American families in which both the wife and husband were em 10 ed rose fromaoout 2 ,700 01 au thority, influencing those in power to dole out new favors or additional privileges to minorities. Their argumeiitis that "democracy" wor est when it is truly plurali stic and inclusive, with the viewpoints of all "racial groups" taken into account. But such a strategy rarely if ver gets to the root of the real problem of the persuasiveness of racism social inequality. It articulates an eclectic, opportunistic approach to change, rather than a comprehensive or systemic critique, informed by ocial theory. In the case of the racial separatists, the general belief that 'race" is a relatively permanent social category in all multiethnic societies, and th at virtually all whites are immutably racist, eIther for genetic, biological or psychologtcal reasons, compro mIses the very concept ot meamngrli)s OciaI Cha~. II alhes are nonexistent or at bes t untrustworthy, or if dialogues with progressive whites must await the construction of broad-based unity among virtually all biacks, then even tactical alliances with social forces outside the black community become difficult to sustain.
But perhaps the greatest single weakness in the politics of racial identity is that it is rooted implicitly in a competitive model of group empowerment. If the purpose of politics is the realiz4tion of a group or constituency's specific objective interest, then racial-identity politics oppressed racial groups; this serves to highlight and emphasize areas of dissension and antagonism.
----T e black-nationalist-oriented intelligentsia, tied to elements of the new African-American upper middle class by income, social position, and cultural outlook, began to search for ways of expressing itself through the "permanent" prism of race, while rationalizing its relatively privileged class position. One expression of this search for a social theory was found in the writings of Afrocentric theorist ¥olefi Asante. Born Arthur Lee Smith in 1942, Asante emerged as the founding editor of the Journal,!! Black StudiM in 1969. Asante became a leading force in the National Council of Black Studies, the African Heritage Studies Association, and, after Ig80, occupied the chair of the African-American Studies Department at Temple University. Asante's basic thesis, the cultural philosophy of '\<\frocentrism," began with the insight that people of European descent or cultures have a radically different understanding of the human condition from people of African and/or non-Western cultures and societies. "Human beings tend to recognize three fundamental existential postures one can take with respect to the human condition: feeling, knowing, and acting," Asante observed in 1983. Europeans utilize these concepts separately in order to understand them objectively. Thus "Eurocentrists U tend to understand their subjects "apart from the emotions, attitudes, and cultural definitions of a given context." Scholars with a fCEurocentric" perspective -those who view the entire history of human development from the vantage point of European civilization -are also primarily concerned with a "subject/ object duality" which exists in a linear environment. European cultures and people are viewed as the central subjects of history, the creative forces which dominate and transform the world over time. Asante states that this "Euro-linear" viewpoint helps to explain the construction of institutional racism, apartheid and imperialis~ across the nonwhite world.
By contrast, the Afrocentric framework for comprehending society and human development is radically different, according to Asante. Afrocentrism " understands that the interrelationship of knowledge with cosmology, society, religion, medicine, and traditions stands alongside the interactive metaphors of discourse as principle means of achieving a measure of knowledge about experience." Unlike a linear view of the world, the Afrocentric approach is a "circular view n of human interaction which useeks to interpret and understand." In theoretical terms, this means that the study of African and African-American phenomena should be within their original cultural contexts, and not within the paradigmatic frameworks of Eurocentrism. Drawing upon African cultural themes, values and concepts, Afrocentrism seeks therefore the creation of a harmonious environment in which all divergent cultures could coexist and learn from each other. Rather than seeking the illusion of the melting pot, AsaDte calls for the construction of "parallel frames of reference" within the context of a multicultural, pluralistic environment. "Universality," Asante warns, "can only be dreamed about when we have slept on truth based on specific cultural experience."
~~"Yractical impac\, ~Lt:~e_the~1)' of Afrocentrism was found among black educators. J\fter aU, if people of African descent had a radically different cultural heritage, cosmology and philosophy of being than whites, it made sense to devise an alternate curriculum which was ''MiOCeIitri2' Such an alternative approach to education would be completely comprehensive, Asante insisted, expressing the necessity for "every topic, economics, law communication, science, religion, history, literature, and sociology to be reviewed through Afrocentric eyes." No African-American child should "attend classes as they are currently being taught or read books as they are currently being written without raising questions about our capability as a people .... AU children must ~e centered in a historical place, or their self-esteem suffers." By 1991, approximately 350 "Afrocentric academies" and private schools were educating more than 50,000 African-American students throughout the country. Many large public-school districts adopted Afrocentric suplementary and required textbooks, or brought in Afrocentric-oriented educators for curriculum-development workshops. Several public-school systems, notably in Detroit, Baltimore, and Milwaukee, established entire 'Afrocentric schools" for hundreds of school-aged children, transforming all aspects of their learning experience. On college campuses, many Black Studies programs began to restructure their courses to reflect Asante's Afrocentric philosophy.
There is no doubt that Afrocentrism established a vital and coherent cultural hilosophy which encouraged African-Americans to react favora Iy towards blac nationa Ism. orne rocentric scholars in the area 61 psychology, notably Lmda James Myers, established innovative and effective measures for promoting the development of positive selfconception among African-Americans. Asante used his position at Temple to create a scholastic tradition which represented a sharp critique and challenge to Eurocentrism. The difficulty was that this schol~r1y version of Afrocentrism tended to be far more sophisticated than the more Ropular ~~rsionol t §J>~Qphy embraced by elements-01' the do atically ~aratlSt,CUlturaUy nationalist community. One such Afrocentric popularIzer was Professor Len Jeffries, the chair of the Black Studies program at the City College of New York. Jeffries claimed that white Americans were nice people" due to environmental, psychological and cultural factors inherent in their evolution in Europe; African-Americans by contrast were defined as nsun people," characteristically warm, open, and charitable. At the level of popular history, the vulgar Afrocentrists glorified in an oversimplistic manner the African nentage 01 black AiDenca;;s. In their writings, they rarelY-~laled ..!!>_e actual comIlJ!:l\l-tIJ:L_ oL,thuo.ca[,l;ultures, divergence 9f, languages, TeJigiOns, and political institutions, and tended to homogenize the sharply dillerent soaalstructures found within the-Mrican 'diaspora.-1 hey paID led wltllpride to the dynasties of Egypt as ille classIcal faun ' " dation of African civilization, without also examining with equal vigo or detail Egypt's slave structure. At times, the racial separatists of vulga Mrocentrism embraced elements of a black chauvinism and intolerance towards others, and espoused public positions which were blatantly antiSemitic. JefTries' public statements attacking Jews, and the countercharge that he espoused anti-Semitic viewpoints, made it easier for white conserv~uives to denigrate all African-American Studies, and to undermine efTorts to require multicultural curricula within public schools.
. Scholarly Afrocentrism coexisted uneasily with its populist variety. When JelTries was deposed as chair of City College's Black Studies Department in the controversy following his anti-Semitic remarks, Asante wisely stayed outside the debate. Nevertheless, there remained theoretical problems inherent in the more scholarly paradigm. MrocenttiC ~tellectuals gave eloquent lip service to . the;, L ii jjg!>ts of 0 ad, scholars sucn as W.Ell. IYu Bois as '' -pillars'' of their own persJ?(',ctiv,l;, WIthout "alsoackllOWled-glngthatDu BOIS's ph'iiOS'Ophyof culture and history conflicted sharply with their own. Du Boi~'s major cu!t'!.':a~ jiliilosopnicalo bservatiiiri;' e xpressed neai-Iy a"' century ago in Till Souls rflilock Foik,c laimed that the-Mrican-Ame ricaii expressesa "double CoiiSCiousness." The blac k American wasl'in -American,· a Negro;t w~ SoUls, two thoughts:-two unreconcifed··strivings; two· \;arring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder." Mrica in efTect represents only half of the dialectical consciousness of African-American people. Blacks are also legitimately Americans, and by our suffering, struggl~-;:;~d~ulture we have a destiny within this geographical and poliucal space equal to or stronger than cinr.~hlte ~mencan. I fii'Sreilization thaithe es;nceofthe inner spirit of Mrican-Amencan people was reflected in this core duality was fundamentally ignored by the Mrocentrists.
Vulgar Mrocentrists del!beratel i!l!!ored or obscured the historical r_e~i,ty of social class strat~cation within the Mric;m diasP9~~. They essentially argued that the interests of all black people -from Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Genera! Colin Powell to conservative Supreme Court Associate Justice Clarence Thomas, to the black unemployed, homeless, and hungry of America's decaying urban ghettoes -were philosophically, culturally and racially the same. Even the schciliirly Afrocentric approach elevated a neo-Kantian idealism above even a dialectical idealist analysis, much less speaking to historical materialism except to attack it as such. Populist Afrocentrism was the perfect social theory for the upwardly m<ilit1e black petty bourgeoisie. It gave them a vague sense of ethnic su eriori and cultural.2!iginality. without requiring the hard, critical stud of historical realities. It provided a p I osop ica ueprint to avoid concrete struggle within the real world, Since potential white "allies" certainly were nonexistent and all cultural cnange began from withTn~_ It was;-in s hort, on y e latest theoretical construct 'of a politics of racial identity, a world-view designed to discuss the world but never really to change it.
!;low do we transcend the theoretical limitations and social contradicHons of the politics of racial identity? The challenge begins by c"n- With the growth of a more class-conscious black and Latino petty bourgeoisie -ironically, a social pro~uct of affirmative action and civilrights gains -tensions between these two large communities of people of color began to deteriorate. The representatives of the MricanAmerican middle class consolidated their electoral control of the city councils and mayoral posts of major cities throughout the country. Black entrepreneurship increased, as the black American consumer market reached a gross sales figure of $'70 billion by 199', an amount equal to the gross domestic product of the fourteenth wealthiest nation on earth. The really important "symbolic triumphs" of this privileged strata of the African-American community were not the dynamic Ig84 and Ig88 presidential campaigns of jesse jackson; they were instead the electoral victory of Democratic "moderate" Doug Wilder as Virginia governor)n 1990, and the appointment of former-jackson-lieutenantturned-moderate Ron Brown as head of the Democratic National Committee. Despite the defeats represented by Reaganism and the absence of affirmative-action enforcement, there was a sense that the strategy of "symbolic representation" had cemented this stratum's hegemony over the bulk of the black popuiation. Black politicians like Doug Wilder and television celebrity journalists such as black-nationaTist-turned-Republican Tony Brown weren"t inter:este"d in pursuing coalitions between blacks and other people of color. Multiracial, multi-, class allIanCeS raised too many questions about the absence of political accountability between middle-class "leaders" and their working-class and low-income "followers." Even Jesse Jackson shied away from addressing a black-Latino alliance except in the most superficial terms.
By the late 19805 and early Ig90s, however, the long-delayed brow,!-black dialogue at the national level began crystallizing into tensions around at least four critical iSs-ues.-First , after the Census of 19 §O;Sco-res" of congressional distric~re ; eapportioned with African-American or Latino pluralities or majorities, guaranteeing greater minority-group representation in Congress. However, in cities and districts where Latinos and blacks were r~g!!!y' divided anc;! J'.sRecialJy miliose distrICts' 'wh,ch bfaa<s-nad---conttoiled in previous years but in which Latinos were now lil~_m~_ority, disagreem~.often led to fractious ethnic conRicts. Lannos claimed that they were grossly underrepresented within iflePOIitical process. African-American middle-class leaders argued that· ~unos' actually represented four distinct groups with little to no shared history or common culture: Mexican Americans, concentrated overwhelmingly in the southwestern states; Hispanics from the Caribbean, chiefly Puerto Ricans and Dominicans, most of whom had migrated to New York City and the northeast since 1945; Cuban Americans, mostly middle-to upper-class exiles of Castro's Cuba, and who voted heavily Republican; and the most recent Spanish-speaking emigrants from Central and South America. Blacks insisted that Cuban Americans were definitely not an "underprivileged minority," and as such did not merit minority set-aside economic programs, affirmativeaction and equal-opportunity programs. The cultural politics of Afrocentrism made it difficult for many African-Americans to recognize that the~.J!!i~share any common interest with Latinos.
~mmigration issues are ~so at the q:nt.!;.r of ~ecent Latinob(ack conflicts. Over one-third of the Latino 0 ulation of more that 2 m IOn 'in e conSists a un acumen ted workers. Some middJec ass African-American ea ers ave taken the politically conservative viewpoint that undocumented Latino workers deprive poor blacks of jobs within the low-wage sectors of the economy~ilingual education and efforts to impose linguistic and cuitura1Co'n'fOrl11ity upon all sectors of society (such as "English-only" referenda) have also been issues of contention~ the key element that drives these topics of debate is the rapid transformation of America's nonwhite demography. Because of relatively higher birth rates than the general population and substantial immigration, within less than two decades Latinos as a group will outnumber African-Americans as the largest minority group in the USA. Even by 1990, about one out of nine US households spoke a nonnglish language at home, predominately Spanish. Black middle-class leaders who were accustomed to advocating the interests of their constituents in simplistic racial terms were increasingly confronted by Latinos who felt alienated from the system and largely ignored and underrepresented by the political process. Thus in May 1991, Latinos took to the streets in Washington DC, hurling bottles aDd rocks and looting over a dozen stores, in response to the shooting by the local police of a Salvadorian man whom they claimed had wielded a knife. African-American mayor Sharon Pratt Dixon ordered over one thousand police officers to patrol the city's Latino neighborhoods, and ~s ed tear gas to quell the public disturbances. In effect, a black admin-. stration in Washington DC used the power of th,e_police and courts to uppress the grievances of Latinos -just as the white administration ad done against black protesters during the urban uprisings of 1968.
The tragedy here is that too little is done by either African-American or Latino "mainstream" leaders, who practice racial-identity politics to transcend their parochialism and to redefine their agendas on common ground. Latinos and blacks alike can agree on an overwhelming list of issues -such as the inclusion of multicultural curricula in public schools, ~provements in public health care, job training initiative, the expanSion of public transportation and housin for 10w-to moderate-income peoplej an greater alrness and legal rights within the criminal justace system. ]2..espite the i~ge that Latinos as a group are more "economi-cally privileged" than African-Americans, Mexican American families earn only slightly more than black households, and Puerto Rican families earn less than black Americans on average. Economically, Laonos and Afncan-Americans have both experienced the greatest declines in real incomes and some of the greatest increases in poverty rates within the USA. From 1973 to 1990, for example, the incomes for families headed by a parent under thirty years of age declined by 28 per cent for Latino families and by 48 per cent for Mrican-American farnilies. The poverty rates for young families in these same years rose 44 per cent for Latinos and 58 per cent for blacks.
There is also substantial evidence that Latinos continue to experience discrimination in elementary, secondary and higher education which is m many 4 respe ctS mores evere than ' that experienced by A~ -A:mencans: Although hign-scnool gra auationrates for the entire population have steadily improved, the rates for Latinos have declined consistently since the mid 1980s. In [989, for instance, 76 per cent of all Mrican-Americans and 82 per cent of all whites aged between eighteen and twenty-four had graduated from high school. By contrast, the graduation rate for Latinos in [989 was 56 per cent. By [992, the high-school completion rate fDLLatino_ maleLd!S'Pp~ ~o i!Dow~t evel, 47"-8~per cent, since [972 -the year such figures b..9:;!L.lQJ:!c...c9mll-iL~d by the American Council on Education. In colleges and universities, the pattern of Latino inequality was the same. In 1991,34 per cent of all whites and 24 per cent of all Mrican-Americans aged between eighteen and twentyfour were enrolled in college. Latino college enrollment for the same age group was barely [8 per cenl. As of t992, approximately 22 per cent of the non-Latino adult population in the USA possessed at least a fouryear college degree. College graduation rates for Latino adults were jus 10 per cent. Thus, on a series of public policy issues -access to quali education, economic opportunity, the availability of human services and civil rights -Latinos and African-Ameri"cans share a core set 0 common concerns and long-term interests. What is missing is the dynamic vision and political leadership necessary to build something more permanent than temporary electoral coalitions between these groups.
A parallel situation ~~i~~e!.. ween ~iaJ1 _A~ericans ! _ Pacific Americans and the black American community. Two generations ago, the ASlanAmencan population was comparatively small, except in states such as California, Washington, and New York. With the end of discriminatory immigration restrictions on Asians in 1965, however J the Asian American population began to soar dramatically, changing the ethnic and racial character of urban America. For example, in the years 1970 to 1990 the Korean population increased from 70,000 to 820,000.
Since 19Bo, about 33,000 Koreans have entered the USA each year, a rate of immigration exceeded only by Latinos and Filipinos. According to the 1.990 census, the Asian American and Pacific Islander [l0pulaii"on inthe US_ f\ . ex-=e~dsI3 l1lillio,:!.
. ----me of the newer Asian immigrants in th~ .!.97~ and 19Bos were of middle.c1as~igin ~i~ -backgrounds i~ entrepreneurship, sIDaIl manufacturing lmd the white-colla;:-p'!9f~. Thousands-or Asian American small~scale: taffiily-owned businesses began to develop in black and Latino neighborhoods, in many ·instances taking the place of the Jewish merchants in the ghettoes a generation before. It did not take long before Latino and black petty hostilities and grievances against this new ethnic entrepreneurial group crystallized into deep racial What is required is a radical break from the narrow, race-based politics of the past, which characterized the core assumptions about black empowerment since the mid nineteenth century. We need to recognize that the two perspectives of racial-identity politics that are frequently juxtaposed, integration/assimilation and nationalist/separatism} are actually two sides of the same ideological and strategic axis. To move .into the future will require that we bury the racial barriers of the past, for good. The essential p.!lint of departure is the deconstruction of the idea of "w hiteness," the idealo of white ower, rivile e and elitism w IC remains heavily embedded within the d min t ulture social mstItubons an economic arrangements of the society. But we must do more than critique the white pillars of race, gender and class domination.
We must rethink and restructure the central social categories of collective struggle by which we conceive and understand our own political reality.
We must redefine "blackness" and other traditional racial categories to be more inclusive of contemporary ethnic realities.
To be truly liberating, a social theory must reflect the actual problems of a historical conjuncture with a commitment to rigor and scholastic truth . '\<\frocentrism" fails on all counts to provide that clarity of insight into the contemporary African-American urban experience. It looks to a romantic, mythical reconstruction of yesterday to find some under-" standing.of ,the cultural basis of today's racial and class challenges. Yet that critical understanding of reality cannot begin with an examination of the lives of Egyptian Pharaohs. It lJ1ust begin by critiquing the vast structure of ower and rivile e wh' racterizes the olitical economy 0 post-industrial capitalist America. According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, during the Reagan-Bush era of the 1980s the poorest one-fifth of all Americans earned about $7,725 annually, and experienced a decline in before-tax household incomes of 3.8 per cent over the decade. The middle fifth of all US households earned about $31 ,000 annually, with an income gain of 3.1 per cent during the 1980s. Yet the top fifth of household incomes reached over $105,200 annually by 1990, with before-tax incomes growing by 29.8 per cent over the 1980s. The richest 5 per cent of all American households exceeded $206,000 annually, improving their incomes by 44.9 per cent under Reagan and Bush. The wealthiest 1 per cent of all US households reached nearly $550,000 per year, with average before-tax incomes increasing by 75.3 per cent. In effect, since 1980 the income gap between America's wealthiest 1 per cent and the middle class near!JI doubkd. As the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities relates, the wealthiest 1 per cent of all Americans -roughly 2.5 million people -receive "nearly as much income after taxes as the bottom 40 per cent, about 100 million people. While wealthy households are taking a larger share of the national income, the tax burden has been shifted down the . come pyramid." socia t eory 0 a reconstructed, multicultural democracy must advance the reorganization and ownership of capital resources, the expansion of production in minority areas, and provision of guarantees for social welfare -such as a single-payer, national health-care system.
The factor of "race" by itself does not and cannot explain the massive transformation of the structure of capitalism in its post-industrial phase, or the destructive redefinition of uwork" itself, as we enter the twenty-first century. Increasingly in Western Europe and America, the new division between "haves" and "have nots" is characterized by a new segp.=ntation of the labor force. The division is between those ·Workers who have maintained basic economic security and benefits ~ -such as full health insurance, term life insurance, pensions. educational 7tIpends or subsIdIes lor the employee's children. paid vacations. and so forth -and those ,,!ar~al workers who are either unemployed, or part-tIme employees, or who labor but have rew if an benefits. Since tg82.; U(e-mlJ"ofary emp oymeni f ' or part-time hirings without benefits have increased 250 per cent across the USA, while all employment has grown hy less that 20 per cent. Today, the largest private employer in the USA is Manpower, Inc., the world's largest temporary employment agency, with 560,000 workers. By the year 2000, half of all American workers will be classified as part-time employees, or, as they ace termed within IBM, "the peripherals." The reason for this massive restructuring of labor relations is capital's search for surplus value . or profits .
..!;:>creasingly, disproportionately high percentages of Latino an!! African-American workers will be tra~ within tltis second-tier of the labor market.:ot!lack, Latino, Asian-~~~~~i~·~-;
. white workers an-share a stake in fighting for a new social contract relaung to work and social benefits: the right to a good job should be guaranteed in the same way as the human ri ht to vote; the right toIree high-quality health care should be as secure as the freedol1!. .. Q{ speech. The radical changes within the domestic economy require that black readership reaches out to other oppressed sectors of the society, c .. eatio a common program for eco mie and social . ustice. Vulgar rocentrism looks inward; the new black liberation of the twenty-~t century must look outward, embracing those eo Ie of color and oppress~--.o-Teor-dlvergent etI1nlCba;;kgrounds who shar .. e_ Q!!.!:
The multicultural democratic crItIque must consider the changing demographic, cultural and class realities of modern post-industrial America. By the year 2000, one-third of the total US population will consist of people of color. Within seventy years, roughly half o~ America's entire populalion will be Latino, American Indian, Pacific American, Arab Alllerican ~ Afrjcan_America.p. The ability to create a framework for multicultural democracYl inter-group dialogue, and interaction within and between the most progressive leaders, grassroots activists, intellectuals and working people of these communities will determine the future of American society itself. Our ability to transcend racial chauvinism and inter-ethnic hatred and the old definitions or 
